When law and economics was a dangerous subject by Giocoli, Nicola
32 / Regulation / Winter 2015–2016
A t the turn of the 20th century, railroad regulation was hotly debated in the United States. railways were accused of abusing their monopolistic positions, particularly because of their use of rate discrimination—the charg-ing of different rates for seemingly similar services. Public pressure for tighter regulation 
led to the 1906 Hepburn Act, which strengthened the regulatory 
powers of the interstate Commerce Commission (iCC). 
American economists were actively involved in this debate. 
While most of them belonged to the pro-regulation camp, the 
best economic analysis came from those who used the logic of 
modern law and economics to argue that most railroads’ prac-
tices, including rate discrimination, were rational, pro-efficiency 
behavior. However, as one of those economists, the University of 
Chicago’s Hugo richard Meyer, would discover, arguing those 
ideas before they had gained broad scholarly acceptance could 
prove professionally costly.
this article uses Meyer’s sad tale to review the pre-1906 Ameri-
can debate on railroad rate regulation. My goal is to show how 
a few economists had already embraced the gist of what would 
become law and economics, but also how the majority of the 
discipline, as well as legislators and public opinion, rejected this 
approach and, with it, what today’s observers would consider 
sound economic analysis. 
the incident illustrates two broad points: First, new indus-
tries always challenge economists and public authorities in their 
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attempt to determine whether market forces are working satis-
factorily and what the effects of government intervention would 
be. Late 19th-century railroads raised puzzles for scholars and 
regulators. that those who in hindsight got the puzzles right 
had little effect on their profession and policy at the time should 
somehow reassure those who despair today about the ill-devised 
regulation of, say, internet industries. in matters of regulation, 
it can take a long time for public policy to get things right. Sec-
ond, my story shows that economic ideas never fail or succeed 
in a vacuum. regardless of their intrinsic validity, they are only 
accepted when their end-users—be they economists or policymak-
ers and lawmakers—find them persuasive in terms of a broader 
socio-political framework. the economists’ power to persuade is, 
in short, always contextual.
The (alleGed) iNeViTaBiliTy of RaTe ReGUlaTioN
the free play of market forces would benefit society as a whole: 
that was the main message—and promise—of classical economics. 
the message was supported by a theoretical apparatus in which 
full capital mobility and the profit equalization theorem (that is, 
the tendency of risk-adjusted rates of return to equalize across 
industries) occupied center stage. 
railways presented post–Civil War America with a wholly 
different scenario, one where, because of the enormous amount 
of fixed capital required, a business could not easily enter and 
exit the market, while competition led active firms toward either 
financial ruin or absolute monopoly. the underlying assumptions 
and fundamental theorems of classical economics simply made 
no sense in the industry, or so it seemed. “the railway system is 
not one which is amenable to the laws of supply and demand,” 
HISTORY
degree of intensity, the principle of free competition is power-
less to exercise a healthy regulating influence.” the underlying 
economics was easy to grasp: “the capacity of the old road may 
be extended at a cost comparatively less than would be required 
by the building of a new road; and, so decided are the advantages 
of an established business over one struggling into existence, 
that it is fair to regard the old road as practically free, for a long 
time at least, from the competitive interference of new capital.” 
Complete monopoly seemed the inevitable outcome of the lack 
of competition, as well as the most obvious way to achieve “the 
cheapest possible transportation.”
 Such an outcome was, however, unacceptable to Americans, 
who loathed monopoly, especially in the case of so vital an indus-
observed Charles Francis Adams, a pioneer of modern regula-
tion. the reason was scale economies: “it is an undisputed law of 
railway economics that the cost of movement is in direct inverse ratio 
to the amount moved” (emphasis in original). Competition simply 
did not apply in this case. the inverse relation between cost and 
traffic pointed to “a conclusion which is at the basis of the whole 
transportation problem: competition and the cheapest possible trans-
portation are wholly incompatible.”
A decade later, every American economist had become aware 
of the peculiarities of the railway industry. Another Adams, 
University of Michigan economist and iCC statistician Henry 
Carter Adams, was archetypal of the almost universal recogni-
tion that “where the law of increasing returns works with any 
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try as railways. railroads were commonly depicted as abusing their 
monopoly power. High rates were accompanied by discriminatory 
practices, where railroads arbitrarily charged different rates to 
different customers (often in the form of selective rebates). Most 
American economists and the public believed that railroads were 
inevitable—that is, natural—monopolies and the only way to con-
trol their market power was to regulate their rates.
RailRoads’ WoRsT eVil: RaTe discRimiNaTioN
neither monopoly pricing nor rate wars raised so much pas-
sion and complaint in American society as the discrimination 
of railway fares. the public opinion’s fury verged on hysteria. 
the practice even featured in popular novels—such as Frank 
norris’s The Octopus—as the epitome of the railroads’ rapacious 
and ruthless attitude toward customers and competitors. rate 
discrimination was the single most important and controversial 
problem of railroad regulation during the Gilded Age.
Among the various forms of discrimination, the one attract-
ing most attention, and protest, was the so-called short-haul/
long-haul discrimination. it occurred when a railroad charged a 
higher price per mile for a short distance than it did for a long 
one. net of the fixed cost of loading and unloading the trains, 
which explained part of the differential, long- and short-haul 
rates were often not proportional to actual direct costs of service. 
it was not just a matter of short hauls costing proportionally 
more than long hauls. the loudest complaints arose from the 
fact that short hauls frequently cost absolutely more than long 
hauls, even though the short haul was completely contained 
within the long-haul route. Little surprise that the practice 
could stimulate the fantasy of talented writers. 
novelists are not always good economists, though. What the 
American public failed to understand was that competition, rather 
than cost, determined railway rates. Among those who under-
stood was the iCC chairman himself, Martin Knapp. “the power 
to compete is the power to discriminate,” he acknowledged, so 
that any legislation that “declares unlawful every discrimination 
between individuals or localities is plainly inconsistent with com-
petitive charges.” indeed, the full understanding of the rationale of 
rate discrimination was among the most valuable contributions 
of the late 19th-century marginalist turn in economics. 
in the 1885 treatise Railroad Economics that earned him inter-
national acclaim, future Yale professor Arthur twining Hadley 
applied marginalist techniques to demonstrate what a few earlier 
commentators had already grasped, namely that railway lines did 
not have to be “parallel” in order to compete. the market for rail-
road services between distant points was much more competitive 
than commonly believed precisely because variable costs were so 
small, so that actual mileage did not really affect total cost. thus, 
competing lines often existed that connected the same commer-
cial centers—major American cities—but passed through different 
points en route. it followed that competition for traffic between 
those centers was far greater than competition for traffic between 
the points along the way. this simple observation lay at the heart 
of the short-haul/long-haul problem.
Many had recognized that the portion of fixed costs borne 
by any class of railroad traffic was price-determined rather than 
price-determining. Whenever no competition existed on a certain 
route, railroads set a rate high enough to cover both variable and 
fixed costs. this was typically the case for short-haul rates—that 
is, for traffic between local points almost always connected by 
a single, monopolistic railroad. those fixed costs that were not 
covered by the rates charged on more competitive, long-haul 
traffic were thus repaid by the short-haul rates charged upon 
monopoly routes. Several observers concluded that railroads 
were using their monopolistic short-haul overcharges to cross-
subsidize their competitive long-haul expenses and that, there-
fore, short-haul shippers were unjustly discriminated to the 
benefit of long-haul ones. 
technically speaking, however, no cross-subsidization was 
involved in the practice, at least as long as long-haul rates 
exceeded direct operating costs. As Hadley wrote in a comment 
to the 1887 interstate Commerce Act: “there is not in American 
railroad practice a collision of interest between shippers as a 
class and railroad owners as a class. Laws based on the supposi-
tion that there was, have done much more harm than good.” 
He explained in his treatise that even the shippers who paid 
the high local rate benefited from the short-haul/long-haul 
discrimination. “the points where there is no competition,” he 
conceded, “are made to pay the fixed charges, while the rates for 
competitive business will little more than pay train and station 
expenses.” Still, everybody gained. Long-haul shippers enjoyed 
the benefits of competition, because for the railroads “it is bet-
ter to have business on those terms than to have it go by the 
rival route.” As for short-haul customers, their gain stemmed 
from the fact that 
the local business at intermediate points is so small that this 
alone cannot support the road, no matter how low or how high 
the rates are made. in other words, in order to live at all, the 
road must secure two different things—the high rates for its 
local traffic, and the large traffic of the through points which 
can only be attracted by low rates. if they are to have the road, 
they must have discrimination.
the message was clear: cancel the long-haul traffic and the 
short-haul customers would have no railway at all to ship their 
goods. Who was actually subsidizing whom? 
a classical RaTioNale foR discRimiNaTioN
Hadley did not fight the battle for sound economic thinking 
alone. Another seminal contribution to the development of 
regulatory economics came in 1891, when Harvard profes-
sor Frank William taussig, the influential editor of the Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, gave his own version of why price 
discrimination was important for industries with high fixed 
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costs. Differently from Hadley, taussig’s approach rested on the 
traditional premise of railroads as natural monopolies. thus 
the peculiar structure of their production costs, rather than 
competitive effects, drove his analysis, which borrowed more 
heavily from classical economics.
railroads were an industry subject to joint, indivisible costs. 
this was, generally speaking, the case of “any industry in which 
there is a large plant, turning out, not one homogeneous com-
modity, but several commodities, subject to demand from dif-
ferent quarters with different degrees of intensity.” As taussig 
recognized, John Stuart Mill had already studied this case, 
including its main economic implication: each commodity or 
service contributed to these joint costs “in proportion to the 
demand for it,” that is, the more price-sensitive the demand, 
the lower the contribution to fixed cost. the application to 
railroad rate-making was straightforward: “the different sorts of 
traffic contribute in very different proportions towards paying 
the fixed charges, or the return to capital.” “traffic which will 
continue to come even at comparatively high rates,” taussig 
explained, “will continue to be taxed high, and will contribute 
largely towards fixed charges. traffic for which the demand is 
sensitive to price, and which can be got only at low rates, will 
contribute little.” 
indeed, railroads were a joint cost industry like no other. in 
their case, not only fixed costs, but also the largest part of operat-
ing expenses, represent “outlay not separate for each item of traffic, 
but common to the whole of it or to great groups of it.” A careful 
analysis of the different components of these expenses led taussig 
to claim that only a very small portion of total railway costs was 
directly dependent on the amount of traffic. 
Competition entered into play here. the joint nature of most 
railway costs increased “the fierceness of railway competition, 
due in part to the fact that the enormous plant is irrevocably 
committed to that particular business.” Under competitive 
conditions, only variable costs would be calculated into price: 
“a railway will not retire from the competitive business as long as 
it yields anything above the small fragment of expense directly 
traceable to that particular traffic.” But if fixed costs were not 
accounted for, the railroads would be unprofitable and there 
would be no new investment in them, to the detriment of the 
entire economy. Because the competitive pricing mechanism 
contributed nothing to fixed costs, how could they be repaid? 
taussig’s first conclusion was that cost of service—so beloved 
by anti-discrimination campaigners—had nothing to do with 
rational rate-making, except for the very tiny portion related to 
variable costs. the pervasiveness of the joint cost phenomenon 
entailed that no cost-based rule could determine railroad rates. 
even more explicitly than Hadley, taussig described what is 
now called the “second-best” approach to efficient pricing. today 
we know that in the presence of a multiproduct firm—whose 
overhead costs need to be covered by total revenues but cannot 
be assigned to individual products—a proper use of differential 
pricing can raise total output, spreading the joint costs’ burden 
among more customers. the idea is that the firm would set each 
product’s price above its marginal cost, at 
a level sufficient to cover overheads and 
obtain a normal return on investment. An 
optimal set of markups exists that would 
generate the required total revenue with 
a minimum loss of output with respect 
to the first-best. these efficient markups 
depend on the elasticity of demand and 
are known in modern jargon as ramsey 
prices. Whenever total revenues are larger 
than total costs, including overhead and a 
normal return, the firm is earning supra-
competitive profits. Hence, the proper test for monopoly power 
looks at total revenues and total costs, not at the size of the 
markup on any specific product: even a very high markup is not 
by itself an indicator of monopolistic profit.
taussig had a clear understanding of the technique and 
its implications. in his terminology, the most efficient way to 
repay railroad investments meant charging “what the traffic 
will bear”—i.e., what others called value of service. the principle 
aimed at maximizing railroad traffic on the basis of the custom-
ers’ willingness to pay—that is, of the different elasticities of the 
various portions of demand. taussig’s second conclusion was 
therefore that price discrimination—whatever its basis: freight 
classification, geography, or the amount of competition along a 
particular route—was sound economic behavior, and an efficient 
one at that. “this seems to me to be the fundamental explana-
tion of the classification of freight,” he concluded. “As time 
went on, experience forced on managers, whether in charge of 
public or of private railways, that adaptation of rates to demand 
which is the inevitable outcome of the peculiarities of the 
industry.” All kinds of discrimination, even the most despised 
ones, stemmed from the inexorable logic of joint costs—a purely 
technological feature.
rate discrimination had nothing to do with justice, but with 
technical necessities: “i trust i have succeeded in showing that the 
main peculiarities in railway rates, those which have appeared under 
government management as well as under private management, are 
The proper test for monopoly power looks at total  
revenues and total costs, not at the size of the markup on 
any specific product: even a very high markup is not by 
itself an indicator of monopolistic profit.
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not to be explained on a supposed basis of justice and right, by 
which the well-to-do are charged high, and the needy are left off 
easily” (emphasis added). no form of railroad ownership—public 
or private—which aimed at preserving financial integrity could 
be exempt from applying this iron logic.
iN The lioN’s deN: meyeR’s aea PaPeR
By the turn of the century it was clear that Hadley and taussig 
had failed to reorient the debate on rate discrimination. in fact, 
they had not even managed to persuade the majority of their 
fellow economists. Absent a shared understanding of the theo-
retical basis for rational rate-setting behavior, a simple change 
of personnel had sufficed for the iCC to embrace a harsher 
attitude toward price discrimination. Under the new chairman-
ship of William Morrison, the iCC had started to systematically 
challenge railway rates, asking railroads to contain them within 
“just and reasonable” limits, but providing no legal or economic 
anchor for this provision. 
Still, the “evils” of railroads’ monopolistic practices had 
remained intact. the 1887 act had conferred weak powers to 
the iCC, in particular no authority to 
at least suspend rates under investiga-
tion, let alone set them. Moreover, federal 
courts had consistently rejected the iCC’s 
efforts to expand its statutory authority 
and directly engage in rate-setting. rail-
road regulation was in a stalemate, both 
administratively and jurisprudentially. 
efficient or not, railroad pricing practices 
could go on unabated.
in 1905, the controversy about railroad 
regulation in general, and rate discrimi-
nation in particular, was as intense as ever. railroads remained 
on top of the public enemies’ list. President theodore roosevelt 
rode the anti-railroad wave and made the strengthening of the 
iCC a top item of his political agenda. the passions raised by the 
issue were such that those who dared oppose the populist calls 
for tighter restraints on the railroads’ rate-making freedom “were 
identified as nothing more than mouth-pieces for the railroad 
interests,” according to legal historian Herbert Hovenkamp. the 
principle that competition and technology, rather than cost of 
service, determined the rates was therefore a dangerous one to 
defend. Surveying the topic a year later on behalf of the American 
economic Association (AeA), University of Michigan economist 
Harrison Smalley could uphold the principle, but only because his 
essay’s policy proposals (he supported stricter regulation, aimed 
at promoting public interest over railroads’ rights) counterbal-
anced—in fact, contradicted—the theoretical part. As Hugo Meyer 
experienced, no such escape existed when the policy conclusions 
consistently followed the analysis.
At the time, Meyer could be optimist about his academic 
future. His lingering career had finally taken a positive bent in 
1904, with an appointment as assistant professor of political 
economy at the University of Chicago. now he had been invited 
to present one of the two papers at a special session on railroad 
regulation during the December 1905 meeting of the AeA. 
Meyer had learned his economics well. Hadley and taussig’s 
work inspired his claim that only “upon superficial examination” 
could “the railway rates of this country … appear to be arbitrary, 
inconsistent, and grossly discriminating.” Proper inquiry revealed 
that they were 
not arbitrary but compelled, that is, fixed by competition 
between the railways and the waterways, the competition 
of rival railways, and, most frequently, by the competition 
between rival producing centers and distributing points. … 
examined more carefully, they cease to appear grossly discrimi-
nating, and prove to be honestly and intelligently discriminat-
ing. Moreover, they prove to be marvelously well adapted to the 
needs of our country.
Yet, Meyer went beyond the repetition of economic doctrines. 
He brilliantly mixed legal and economic arguments in an out-
standing application of what we would now call the law-and-
economics point of view. the discipline’s key principles (that 
the law should never disregard the efficiency considerations 
stemming from economic analysis and that, conversely, econo-
mists should always keep an eye on how legal rules affect the 
economy) were the guiding lights of Meyer’s argument—only a 
few decades too early. 
Meyer underlined how correct economic reasoning had found 
support in judicial decisions. “For eighteen years we have had in 
force the act to regulate commerce, which forbids not all discrimi-
nation, but only undue and unjust discrimination,” he reminded 
his audience. “Under that statute the federal courts have sustained 
every great American railway rate practice brought before them for 
adjudication; and the characteristic feature of those practices is dis-
crimination, intelligent and honest, made for the purpose of meet-
ing the needs of trade and industry.” Data showed that railroads 
disobeying the iCC’s rate-related orders had won almost every time 
the controversy had reached a federal court (32 times out of 35). 
Against “the statesmanlike spirit in which the federal courts have 
construed the act,” and contrary to what the iCC itself had done 
Hugo Meyer brilliantly mixed legal and economic  
arguments in an outstanding application of the law-and-
economics point of view. Unsurprisingly, his paper met 
hostile reactions at the AEA meeting and elsewhere.
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in its early years, the commission was now reading “at its pleasure” 
into the same act “political and economic theories, none of which 
the Congress had made a part of the established law of the land, 
and at least one of which is in direct conflict with the intentions of 
the framers of our federal constitution.” the principles followed of 
late by the iCC—for instance, “to grant each community the rightful 
benefit of location,” or “to keep different commodities on an equal 
footing”—found no legitimacy in economic theory or in express 
statutory provisions. these principles “one and all, have meant: not 
the promotion of trade, but the restraint and the partial destruction 
of trade and of competition.” the iCC’s regulatory efforts were, in 
short, destroying efficiency rather than augmenting it.
Abusing its limited power to prescribe railway rates, and not-
withstanding its nature as a pure administrative body, the iCC had 
become, in fact, “a deputy Congress, free to make and unmake 
the public policy as well as the law of the land.” this exercise of a 
quasi-legislative function contradicted established constitutional 
doctrines and was bad economics. “the doctrine that railway 
rates must be based upon respective costs of service” led to dismal 
results: “restraint of competition and trade, and disregard of the 
rights of several of the parties to each controversy over railway 
rates, has been the characteristic feature of every decision in 
which the Commission has condemned a great American railway 
rate practice.” Meyer’s bottom line was clear. While a new statute, 
like the pending Hepburn Act, could settle the legitimacy issue 
by formally granting rate-setting powers to the iCC, use of those 
very powers without a proper understanding of the economics of 
railroad pricing would spell disaster for the American economy. 
Unsurprisingly, Meyer’s tirade met hostile reactions, both at 
the AeA meeting and elsewhere. the discussant in the session, 
Dartmouth economist Frank Dixon, deemed Meyer’s views unac-
ceptable. the political climate of the period in general, and of the 
AeA in particular, led Dixon to declare: “the views of Mr. Hugo 
Meyer … lead inevitably to the policy of extreme laissez-faire, to 
the general conclusion that the interaction of competitive forces, 
undisturbed by state interference, has led and will lead to benefi-
cent results to the people and industries of this country, and that 
any governmental interference must have a tendency to thwart 
the working of this beneficent policy.”
Having so dismissed the old laissez faire dogma, Dixon 
moved on to defend the cost of service principle of rate-making, 
which he dubbed “the distance tariff.” He turned Meyer’s argu-
ment against the principle, and in favor of rate discrimination, 
on its head, arguing that “the policy of disregarding distance, 
which is carried to such an extreme by American [rail]roads” 
had actually been deleterious for the U.S. economy. As he put 
it: “the country has been obliged to bear the burden of indirect 
shipments on differential roads, and cross-shipments of goods 
of the same character to markets far removed from producing 
sections.” in short, what benefited railroads was not necessarily 
good for the country as a whole.
Sadly for Meyer, the negative reactions did not end with an 
unfavorable discussant. this would have been business as usual 
in a scientific meeting. What was really surprising was that the 
second paper read at the session was by and large an attack on 
Meyer’s work rather than an autonomous contribution. the ses-
sion was, in fact, an ambush.
the author of the second paper was another Meyer, Balthasar 
Henry Meyer, an economist and sociologist at the University of 
Wisconsin, who was also a member of the state’s railroad commis-
sion and a future iCC commissioner. Unsurprisingly, he defended 
the work of regulatory bodies. the final sentence of his paper said 
it all: “there are two, and only two, alternatives before the world 
today with respect to railways: either government ownership 
and operation, or rigid governmental control. My choice is the 
second alternative.” Like Dixon, Balthasar Meyer had no faith in 
the beneficial effects of competition: “Competition as a regulator 
of rates and a protector against unreasonable or unjust rates has 
proven itself a failure in every country in which railway systems 
have been developed.” the reason was simply that railways were 
enterprises like no others: 
in current discussions it is frequently asserted that railway 
enterprise is like every other business enterprise, and that no 
more legislation is needed for a railway than for a soap factory. 
this paper assumes that the railway differs in many of its most 
vital aspects from other commercial enterprises, and that upon 
these differences, well understood by nearly every member of 
this Association, but not by many outside of the association, 
rests the necessity of more far-reaching restrictive legislation.
the message was clear. How could an economist deserving his 
name fail to understand that railways were not like soap factories? 
Against Hugo Meyer’s opinion, Balthasar Meyer was skepti-
cal that courts could replace expert commissioners on railroad 
matters. Only one “tribunal with power over the rate to which an 
appeal may be taken for the establishment of a just and reasonable 
basis” did exist: “A railway commission is peculiarly well fitted to 
arbitrate and decide questions arising from antagonistic interest.” 
if granted more power, the iCC would not abuse of it nor manifest 
any “dogmatic adherence to any one principle of rate-making.” it 
was actually true that the iCC’s approach to the rate issue had 
vacillated over the years. Yet, Hugo Meyer’s point was precisely 
that no such swinging was justified in view of the right economic 
explanation of railroad pricing, namely the explanation by Hadley 
and taussig. Balthasar Meyer’s conclusion was the opposite: no 
correct economic theory of railway rates existed; railroad manag-
ers just followed unscientific rules of thumb; regulators should 
thus have a free hand at setting rates in their stead. Any “sane 
man” denying this truth was either a bad economist or a puppet 
in the railroads’ hands—and probably both.
fiNale: a caReeR-eNdiNG iNcideNT
the onslaught of Hugo Meyer’s views did not remain a mere 
academic controversy. Because of his ideas, the Chicago econo-
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mist was directly charged with corruption by a prominent 
member (and future chairman) of the iCC, Judson Clements, 
and by a U.S. senator, iowa republican Jonathan P. Dolliver. 
the indictment followed Meyer’s expert testimony before the 
U.S. Senate Committee on railways in May 1905, a few months 
before the AeA meeting. the testimony was so badly received 
that it triggered accusations of bribery by railroad companies. 
the incident caused great agitation in the academic commu-
nity, especially because of the broader allegation that railroads 
and their privileged clients (e.g., oil companies) were infl uenc-
ing education in top American universities as a strategy to 
further their interests. 
Commissioner Clements declared that “wealth always fi nds 
it is easy to employ men of theory and doctrine and ability to 
express its views, and they are often directed to educating the 
public up to the idea of the superior sanctity of vested rights 
as against individual rights and individual opportunities in 
the contests in which engage in the diff erent walks of life. it is 
ordinarily to be expected that these gentlemen would attack a 
doctrine or practice that was at variance to the doctrines dear 
to the patron saint.” As for Senator Dolliver, he found a way 
to impugn Meyer and his University of Chicago colleagues by 
publicly proclaiming that “the University of Chicago smelled 
of oil like a Kansas town”—this, of course, in reference to the 
munifi cent sponsor (John D. rockefeller) to which the university 
was allegedly subservient.
the public at large liked Meyer’s ideas no better. “Partisan 
and untrustworthy”: with those words the April 4, 1906, issue of 
the Boston Evening Transcript saluted Meyer’s monograph Govern-
ment Regulation of Railway Rates. Such was the measure of popular 
tolerance for any law-and-economics reasoning that, regardless 
of its merit, did not conform to the dominant view that competi-
tion could not work in the case of railways and that government 
intervention was compulsory to protect public interest against 
railroad practices. 
in June 1906, roosevelt’s pressing eventually prevailed. An 
almost unanimous Congress passed the Hepburn Act, empower-
ing the iCC to declare an existing rate unreasonable and prescribe 
a new one. the commission now had full rate-making powers. 
Despite the economists’ massive involvement in the debate, the 
enacted solution was not the one suggested by the best law-and-
economics scholarship. the time for accepting the legal implica-
tions of effi  ciency-based economic reasoning had not come yet. in 
the hands of the iCC, “just and reasonable” rates could be twisted 
to pursue goals other than economic effi  ciency and, sometimes, 
other than U.S. constitutional values. 
Meyer’s academic career ended. Following these incidents, he 
left for Australia in 1907, where he died in 1923 without ever 
returning to the United States. While we cannot be sure about 
the motives for this decision, he never had an academic affi  lia-
tion again. in his new country, he continued to do research on 
British public utilities and the history of state ownership in 
Victoria, but never became a university professor. 
the assault against his—and his employer’s—academic 
integrity did not remain unanswered, though. the powerful 
head of Chicago’s economics Department, James Laurence 
Laughlin, published a note titled “Academic Liberty” in the 
January 1906 issue of the Journal of Political Economy, of which 
he was editor. Laughlin’s words are a good yardstick for appre-
ciating what railroad regulation would actually mean in early 
20th-century America. 
“On the railway question the prevailing tone is one of gen-
eral hostility to large corporations,” he complained. “in some 
academic circles the necessity of appearing on good terms with 
the masses goes so far that only the mass-point-of-view is given 
recognition; and the presentation of the truth, if it happens to 
traverse the popular case, is regarded with something akin to 
consternation.” Yes, academic freedom was at risk, but the threat 
did not come from the railroads’ or oil barons’ money: 
it is not amiss to demand that measure of academic freedom 
that will permit a fair discussion of the rights of those who do 
not have the popular acclaim. it is going too far when a care-
fully reasoned argument which happens to support the conten-
tions of the railways is treated as if necessarily the outcome of 
bribery by the money kings.
not only was the law-and-economics point of view far from gain-
ing acceptance, but with it also the more basic idea that, even 
when dealing with politically sensible issues like railroad regula-
tion, theoretical controversies should be handled independently 
of popular and political pressure. 
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The  
American 
Dream
in America, free enterprise and entrepreneurship  
are under assault from myriad government regulations — 
ranging from laws censoring advertisements to  
burdensome licensing requirements to outrageous 
“certificate of necessity” laws that allow established 
businesses to veto their own competition.
When Kentucky businessman Raleigh Bruner wanted  
to start a moving company, bureaucrats told him he  
couldn’t — because existing companies thought there  
were enough competitors already.
Fortunately, Raleigh and other victims of overreaching 
government have a powerful ally to fight back —  
Pacific Legal Foundation. We litigate pro bono to uphold 
the constitutional guarantees of limited government, free 
enterprise, property rights, and individual liberty. We took 
Raleigh’s case to court and won.
As America’s first freedom-based public interest legal 
foundation, PLF is proud to stand up for the constitutional 
right to earn a living — from coast to coast.
Learn more about Raleigh’s case and PLF’s 40-year legacy 
of rescuing liberty at pacificlegal.org.
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